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The Limited Viability of Dual Exchange-Rate Regimes
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the viability of dual exchange-rate regimes. Typi-
cally, under such a regime the exchange rates applicable to current-account
(commercial) transactions and to capital-account (financial) transactions differ
from each other. This difference may be determined in the free market if the
authorities peg the commercial exchange rate and set a binding quota on external
borrowing, or it may result from direct pegging of both exchange rates. The
analysis starts with a specification of the characteristics of the distortion
introduced by the exchange-rate premium (that is, the percentage discrepancy
between the financial and the commercial exchange rates), and then provides
explicit formula for the equilibrium premium, for its evolution over time and
for the welfare cost induced by the distortion. The paper outlines the set of
policy options consistent with sustaining a permanently viable dual exchange-
rate system and highlights the severe constraints that intertemporal solvency
requirements of the private sector and of the government impose on the long-run
viability of the regime. The paper concludes with an analysis of the monetary
changes associated with dual exchange-rate policies and draws the implications
of such a regime for the intertemporal distribution of taxes and for the inter-
generational distribution of welfare
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This paper deals with the economics of dual exchange—rate regimes.
Multiple exchange—rate arrangements have been adopted by numerous countries on
various occasions. Departures from a unified exchange—rate regime have taken
different forms including multiple exchange rates for different types of
commercial transactions, as well as separate exchange rates for commercial and
financial transactions; the latter is referred to as a dual (or a two—tier)
exchange—rate regime.
The adoption of a dual exchange rate regime, taken by itself, introduces
a distortion into the economic system. Its adoption has been justified,
however, on several grounds. First, it has been argued that in circumstances
of inflation and capital flight (induced by expected depreciations of the
currency) the separation of the commercial exchange rate from the financial
rate facilitates a reduction in capital flight through a change in the finan-
cial exchange rate while avoiding adverse inflationary consequences. Second,
it has been argued that in circumstances of inflation and trade'-balarice
deficits, the adoption of dual exchange rates permits commercial exchange—rate
policies aimed at the trade balance without providing capital gains On
foreign—currency linked assets. In contrast, undera unified exchange—rate
regime a devaluation of the currency provides capital gains to owners of
foreign—currency linked assets. These capital gains stimulate spending and
hamper efforts to contain inflation and to improve the balance of payments. A
third argument used to justify dual exchange rates focuses on their impact on
relative rates of return ana capital flows. Taxes on capital flows, quantita-
tive restrictions on international financial transactions, and dual exchange
rates all influence the relative rates of return on domestic and foreign
investments. Therefore, it is argued, dual exchange rates may be viewed as an
instrument of balance of payments policies.2 Additional arguments concerning2
the welfare implications of dual exchange—rate regimes have also been
developed in the contexts of the analyses of second-best policies and public
finance.3
The literature dealing with the working of dual exchange—rate regimes
examined the determinants of the free financial exchange rate. Issues
analyzed in this context concerned the effects of fiscal, monetary, and
commercial exchange—rate policies on the free financial exchange rate, on the
real exchange rate and on the current account of the balance of paymer.ts. In
analysing these central issues, previous contributions have employed a great
diversity of models while the links among which have not been always spelled
out. This paper develops a unified framework in order to reexamine some of
these issues in an attempt to clarify and identify the mechanisms governing
the operation of dual exchange—rate regimes. We specify the precise nature of
resultant distortions and provide an exact measure of the welfare cost. In
characterizing the dual exchange—rate regime we assume that the commercial
exchange rate applicable to transactions in the balance of trade is pegged and
we examine two alternative formulations concerning the financial exchange
rate. In the first formulation the government sets a binding quota on the
volume of external debt and the financial exchange rate is determined in the
free market. With a binding quota the equilibrium financial exchange rate
exceeds the pegged commercial rate; the percentage discrepancy between the two
is defined as the dual exchange—rate premium. Our analysis provides an
explicit formula for the equilibrium premium as well as for its evolution over
time. In the second formulation the government pegs the dual exchange—rate
premium (through pegging the paths of both the commercial and the financial
exchange rates) but allows for a free mobility of capital. In this case our
analysis provides an explicit formula for the equilibrium path of external
debt.3
Since our model is characterized by sophisticated forward looking and
fully informed individuals, a natural question is whether the dual exchange—
rate system is viable. Specifically, since both the government and the
private sector must be solvent we examine the constraints that long—run
viability imposes on the management of the dual exchange rate system. We show
that there is a limited set of policy options consistent with a permanently
viable dual exchange—rate system. For example, we show that unless the dual
exchange—rate premium or the quota on foriegn debt are set at a level which
eliminates asset accumulation, a policy that fixes permanently the premium or
the quota cannot be sustained indefinitely without violating the solvency
constraints.5 On the other hand a transitory adoption of a dual exchange rate
regime is of course possible. We examine the relation between the length of
the period during which the dual exchange rate system is in effect and the
magnitudes of the premium and of the external debt. In considering the adop-
tion of a dual exchange—rate regime the limitations imposed by the intertem-
poral solvency constraints on the long—run viability of the system are added
to the difficulties associated with the separation between the commercial and
the financial exchange markets. The segmentation difficulties are present in
6
both the short run and the long run.
Our model does not provide a rationale for the adoption of a dual
exchange rate regime. Rather, in order to clarify the working of the system
and to identify the distortions arising from its adoption we start from a
distortion—free economy and examine the implications of introducing a dual
exchange—rate regime.7
In section II we develop a benchmark model posessing the Ricardian
equivalence property. Accordingly, the timing of the monetary injections
associated with the management of the dual exchange—rate system does not
influence the real equilibrium. In the benchmark model the management of the14
dual exchange—rate regime affects the equilibrium through the induced dif-
ferentials between domestic and world real rates of interest. In section III
we extend the benchmark model to a framework in which the Ricardian equiv-
alence does not hold. This is achieved by allowing for overlapping gener-
ations with a finite horizon. In that case the management of the dual
exchange-rate regime impacts on the equilibrium not only through influencing
real interest—rate differentials but also through influencing the timing of
monetary injections and international reserve movements. Hence, under such
circumstances the dual exchange—rate regime inflicts the usual distortions and
in addition, the management of the regime directly influences the exchange—
rate premium, the intergenerational distribution of wealth, and welfare.
Specifically, we examine the circumstances under which a rise in the commer-
cial exchange rate (a devaluation) leads to overshooting or undershooting of
the market—determined financial exchange rate. This analysis provides infor-
mation about the effects that commercial exchange—rate policies exert on the
premium. Hence, by focusing on the temporary nature of the dual exchange—rate
regime and by highlighting the links between the regime and the intertemporal
distribution of effective taxes and distortions, we introduce pertinent
intergenerational considerations into the analysis of dual exchange—rate
systems. Finally, section IV contains concluding remarks.
II.TheBenchmark Model
In this part of the paper we sketch the benchmark model for the analysis
of dual exchange—rate regimes. In order to highlight the key issues we focus
on two alternative (but to a large extent equivalent) formulations of such
regimes. In both the exchange rate applicable to commercial transactions
passing through the trade account of the balance—of—payments is pegged. The
two formulations differ in their specification of the regulations concerning5
financial transactions. The first assumes that the government imposes a
quota on the volume of the international flow of financial assets. In that
case the financial exchange rate is determined in the free market at a level
that may differ from the pegged commercial rate. Our analysis examines the
precise determinants of the differential between the two rates. This dif-
ferential is referred to as the premium. The second formulation assumes that
the government sets different paths for the commercial and the financial
exchange rates. In that case the premium is determined by policy and the
volume of capital—account transactions is determined by the free market. In
this context we determine the constraints on the range of feasible paths of
the two exchange rates. These constraints arise from the requirement that the
government and the private sector must be solvent.
Our benchmark model, which is designed to yield Ricardian equivalence
results, assumes a small open economy with one composite traded good and
undistorted taxes. These assumptions are modified in subsequent sections.
The key building blocks of the model are (1) a specification of the private
sector's budget constraints and behavioral functions; (ii) a specification of
the government budget constraint and (lii) the determination of equilibrium.
11.1. The private sector
Consider a representative individual operating in an environment governed
by a 4cash—in—advance" convention according to which purchases of domestically
produced goods are paid for with domestic currency while purchases of foreign
produced goods are paid for with foreign currency. The cash—in-advance model
allows great precision in tracing out the monetary and exchange ratepolicies
all the way through, and it introduces no distortions fl Conjunction with the
monetary policy per Se. This enables us to isolate the effects of the dual6
exchange rate regime. For applications of such a convention see Helpman (1981),
Helpman and Razin (1982), Lucas (1982), Persson (1984) and Stockmari (1980).










where e denotes the exchange rate applicable for comercial_transactions
and s denotes the exchange rate applicable for financialtransactions.
These exchange rates express the price of foreign exchange in terms of
domestic currency. In equation (1) p* denotes the foreign price of goods,
Y measures domestic output, T denotes lump—sum taxes, B denotes the
private—sector's one—period debt denominated in terms of foreign exchange, R
denotes one plus the Interest rate applicable to loans In terms 0f foreign
currency, C, denotes the rate of consumption of the composite good and,
finally, M denotes initial money holdings (the money supply in period t —
Thefirst equation in (1) specifies the budget constraint in period
zero. The left—hand—side measures the domestic—currency value of consumption
(where we have used the law of one price by which domestic price, p, equals
ep*). The right—hand—side measures the total amount of available net
resources (measured in terms of domestic currency): Initial money holdings
minus taxes plus new borrowing minus repayment of interest and principal on
previous period one—period debt.
The second budget constraint has a similar interpretation except that it
includes the nominal value of period—zero output. This element reflects the7
cash—in—advances convention according to which during each period firms
accumulate cash balances obtained from theproceedsof output sales and at the
end of each period (which coincides with the beginning of the subsequent one)
these proceeds are redistributed to individuals as wages and dividends. These
money holdings at the beginning of period 1 equal the value of domestic output
sales during period zero (e0pY0). The rest of the constraints in
(1) are interpreted similarily.
Consolidating the budget constraints and making use of the requirement
that at the limit all debt must be paid8 yields:
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This constraint which defines the initial value of wealth, W0, is
expressed in terms of units of consumptionin the initial oeriod. The econopjc
interpretation of the various terms in (2) is as follows. The term in the
parenthesis multiplying C1 is the domestic real discount factor applicable
for consumption in period one. It is composed of three components. First,
the foreign nominal interest factor (1/R0); second, one plus the foreign
rate of inflation (p/p*) and thus the product (p/p)/R is the
foreign real discount factor; and finally the third component represents
the ratio of the percentage depreciation of the two exchange rates8
(e1!e)/(s1/s) (in a continuous time specification this term would be the
difference between the percentage rates of depreciation of the two exchange
rates). This last component represents the contribution of exchange—rate
changes to the real rate of return on investment in financial assets, that
is, the capital gain on an iavestthent inassets denominated in foreign cur-
rency is (s11s0) and its product with (e0/e1) translates the return to
units of foreign—currency denominated goods. Thus, the product
(e1Ie)(s/s1)(plp*)/R is the domestic real discount factor applicable to
C1. Similar interpretation applies to the coefficients multiplying the rates
of consumption in other periods. As is evident, divergencies between the
domestic and the foreign real rates. of interest stem from the terms involving
exchange—rate changes. It is important to note that these divergencies can
arise only from differences in. the percentage rates of depreciations of the
commercial and financial exchange rates. In the absence of such a difference,
the domestic and foreign real rates of interest are equalized. In that case
all allocations replicate those obtained with a completely free world capital
market.9
Theterm in the parentheses multiplying the levels of output on the
right—hand—side of equation (2) also represents present value factors but,
as may be seen, these differ from those used to evaluate the sequence of con—
sumption. The difference arises from the underlying ttcash_in_advancelf assump-
tion according to which nominal proceeds from sales of output are distributed
with one period lag. Thus, for example, the ratio of the coefficients of
and C1 is (s11s2)(l/R1) which is the foregone nominal rate of return due to
the lagged payment. The next group of terms on the right—hand—side of equation
(2) represents the sum of the nominal taxes discounted by the nominal rate of
interest. Here it is relevant to note that the government, by pegging the9
initial value of the commercial exchange rate, e
,influencesthe real value
of this discounted sum. Finally, the last term on the right—hand—side of
equation (2) is the real value of the private sector initial debt. We note
that the policy choice of sand, thereby, the initial ratio of the two
exchange rates, s /edetermines the real value of this initial debt commit— 00
meat.Thus, the foregoing discussion of the various termsinequation (2)
shows that there are four policy considerations which affect the budget con-
straint under a dual exchange rate regime. First, the initial level of the
commercial exchange rate, e ,second,the Initial level of the financial
exchange rate, s ,third,the difference between the percentage rates of
change of the two exchange rates and fourth, the path of taxes.
In a subsequent section we determine the precise equilibrium of the
system. In order to obtain simple solutions we continue this sketch by
specifying, in equation (3), a logarithmic utility function.
(3) U =109C
where denotes the subjective discount factor. Maximization of (3) subject
to the consolidated budget constraint (2) yields equation (4) as the
consumption function:
(4) Ct
where denotes the domestic present—value factor which depends on the







We note that is the reciprocal of the coefficient multiplying10
C in the consolidated budget constraint in equation (2). The dependence
of on the evolution of the two exchange rates implies that government
policies concerning the management of the dual exchange—.rate system has a
direct effect on the intertemporal allocation of consumption and asset
accumulation.
1.2.TheGovernment
Indiscussingthe government sectoritis convenient toseparate
government transactions into two accounts: a domestic currency account and a
foreign currency account. In specifying these accounts we distinguish between
the two formulations of the regulations governing international financial
transactions.
We begin with the formulation which assumes that the government sets the
paths of the two exchange rates and allows free mobility of capital at the
prespecified exchange rates. Under these circumstances international financial
transactions that are undertaken by the private sector reflect themselves in the
domestic—currency account of the government since the latter is comitted to peg the
financial exchange rate. Thus, in period t the monetary expansion induced by
government foreign exchange intervention in pegging the
financial exchange rate is t(Bt —RtiBti),where denotes the pegged
financial exchange rate.rn addition, foreign exchange intervention in
pegging the comercial exchange rate corresponds to the trade balance and
the monetary expansion that is associated with this operation in period t is
etp(Yt —Ct).Denoting total monetary injections associated with





The second formulation of the regulations concerning international
financial transactions assumes that the government imposes a quota on the11
volume of the economy's net international borrowing. Since in our model all
debt is of one—period maturity, this constraint amounts to a quota on the size
of the economy's external debt. We denote thisquota by There are
many alternative mechanisms and institutional specifications thatcan bring
about the enforcement of such a quota. Forexample, the government may specify
an upper limit on private borrowing from abroad. Inthat case the comitment
to peg the corrinercjal exchange rate ata given level implies that the
government must stand ready to supply foreignexchange to cover trade
deficits. In order to obtain the foreignexchange necessary to peg the
coninercial exchange rate without increasing itsnet borrowing from abroad, the
government is assumed to purchase thenecessary quantity in the local market
for foreign exchange (at the free financialexchange rate). It is important
to note that the details of this mechanismare introduced only as a convenient
example rather than an intrinsic characteristic of thisspecification of the
dual exchange—rate regime. With this formulationthe monetary injections
associated with foreign exchange interventionsare two: purchases of foreign
currency In the local financial market and sales of foreignexchange to cover
the trade deficit. Accordingly equation(5) becomes
(5') X =ep(Y-Cr) +st(t—Rtiti).
These two alternative formulations of themonetary consequences of
exchange rate interventions reflect themselves in themoney supply.
Accordingly, the money supply in period t can beexpressed as the sum of the
initial supply 1 and the cumulativemonetary injections through exchange--
rate interventions minus tax receipts:
(6) Mt = + —I)12
The government foreign account states that government net external
borrowing must equal the trade balance deficit minus the private sector's net
external borrowing. Denoting the economy's net external borrowing by B* and
noting that B* equals the sum of private and government external borrowing
implies that
(7) P(Ct —) —
—
Consolidatingthe sequence of the constraints in equation (7) and using
the solvency requirement yields
*
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Equation (8) states that the discounted sum of the trade balance (evaluated
by using the world real rates of interest) must equal the initial net foreign
asset position.1°
11.3. Equilibrium and Distortions of Dual Exchange Rate Regimes
Equilibrium requires that the demand for money equals the supply. Since
in this model with positive nominal rate of interest money is not held as a
store of value, the entire money supply is absorbed by firms in exchange for
output sales. Thus, the demand" for money is ep*Yt and in equilibrium
(9) Mt =epY.
In order to characterize the equilibrium of the system we first express
the equilibrium value of wealth, W0. The focus on the analysis of
enables a simple exposition of the nature of the distortions that characterize
the dual exchange—rate regime. Further, such an analysis yields insights into
the determination of alternative policies that can be used in order to obtain13
equivalent results. Using the right—hand—side of equation(2) along with the
government accounts (5) (or (5')) (6) and (7), and themoney market clearing
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Equation (10) shows the equilibrium value ofW0 corresponding to the
two alternative formulations of the dualexchange—rate regime which underlie
equations (5) and (5'). When the policy is formulated in sucha way so as to
peg the paths of the two exchange rates, the endogeneous variable that is
determined in equilibrium j3 B* —theeconomy's net external borrowing (in
that case the reader may wish to put anupper bar over the two exchange
rates). On the other hand, when the policypegs only the commercial exchange
rate and places a quota over the magnitude of theeconomy's net external
borrowing, the endogeneaus variab)e that is determined in equilibrium isS—
thefree market financial exchange rate (in thatcase the reader may wish to
put an upper bar over the variables e and B*).
This presentation of the egui1ibriuti value of wealth highlights three
considerations. First, in cotuparison with the pricing ofconsumption in
equation (2) (as reflected by the coefficients of here the pricing of
outputs is also done by using the domestic real interest rates. Thus, in
contrast with the formulation in equation (2), in equilibrium thelagged
payment which reflects the cash—in—advance convention has no effect on the14
pricing of outputs.Second, the benchmark model highlights the consequences
of having a forward looking rational consumer who fully internalizes future
tax liabilities associated with initial government external debt. Thus, in
conformity with the Ricardian proposition, the equilibrium value of wealth
nets Out the term(R1311P). Third,and most important, the unique element
introduced by the existence of capital controls and the dual exchange—rate
system is represented by the expressions in the last squared brackets on the
righ—hand—side of equation (10). This expression denotes the discounted sum
of the implicit tax transfers associated with the dual exchange—rate system
as perceived (and taken as given) by the rational, forward looking, individuals.
Specifically, consider the coefficient of B which can also be written as
(eIs1([(s1Is) —(e1/efl.As argued earlier, this term represents the dif-
ference between domestic and foreign real rates of eturn on financial invest-
ment. Thus, if for example, the rate of depreciation of the financial exchange
rate exceeds the rate of depreciation of the commercial rate so that (s1Is)
is larger than (e1!e0) then with a positive net external debt, B ,there
is an implicit subsidy to domestic asset holders. In that case the percentage
subsidy rate is *[()—.()} andits product with the "subsidy base",
ep o 00
*
B ,yieldsthe implicit transfer in period zero. The rest of the terms on the
right—hand—side of equation (10) have a similar interpretation except that they
are discounted to the present by using the world rates of interest. In the case
in which the commercial nd the financial exchange rates change at the same
percentage rate, so tfiat e÷i/e = ,theimplicit tax—subsidy rates are
zero. In that case there is no divergence between douestic and foreign real











Thus,in that case the equilibrium value wealth is the discountedsum of
current and future incomes net of initial external debt. Withequal rates of
depreciation the equilibrium replicates the outcome obtained with freeopen
capitalaccount of the balance—of—payments. In that case (and in contrast
with equation (10)), the time path of externaldebt, 8, does not
influencethe equilibrium value of wealth and consumption. Ingeneral,
however, the time patterns of external debt, 8*, impactson the real
equilibrium.
The foregoing interpretation of equation (10) illustrates twokey
issues. First, it highlights the fact that the dualexchange—rate regime
operates in a manner that introduces implicit taxes on capital flows. It
follows, therefore, that such outcomes can also be replicatedthrough explicit
taxation of, or quotas on, financial capital flows undera floating
exchange—rate regime. Second, our formulation presented the precise
manifestation and magnitude of the distortions thatare associated with the
dual exchange—rate regime.
It is noteworthy that the analysis of the equilibrium value ofW0 did
not employ the specific behavioral assumptionsunderlyig the utility function
(and, thereby, the Consumption function). In subsequent sectionswe will
analyze in detail the factors that govern the dynamic evolution ofwealth,
external debt, and the exchange rates. For thispurpose we will need to use
the specific behavioral assumptions. In order to set thestage for such an
analysis it is convenient to derive the equilibrium relation between external
debt, initial wealth and the two exchange rates.
In general, the economys external debt in period t can be writtenas
the difference between the sums of the present values ofpast as well as
current consumptions and outputs adjusted for the initial debt comitments (in
present value). The compoundings of these quantities are performed as usual
by employing the world rates of interest.16
Substituting the consumption function (4) into the economy's budget
constraint (7), and solving the difference equation for B (for any
given value of W0), yields
(11) =(l_s)R0...Rti
+(&-)+62?. .....2.) +•••+(5t _!_2.)]
_[RO.Ri...RtIPYO +Ri...Rt1pY1 + + ptYtJ
+R0R1...Rtl(Rl8*l).
Using the solvency requirement that at the limit (as time goes to




(12) pW = o
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Equations(1O)—(12) constitute the system which can be solved in order to
yield the entire equilibrium paths of B, the ratio of the two exchange
rates and the equilibrium value of W0. These solutions provide a complete
characterization of the real equilibrium of the system. The solution of the
real system can be used together with equation (2) in order to determine the
implied value of the discounted sum of nominal taxes and transfers. As is
evident in the present benchmark model all that matters are discounted sums of
the lump—sum taxes and transfers rather than their precise -timing. This pro-
perty reflects the structure of the model which yields Ricardian—equivalence
propositions. In a subsequent section we relax some of the assumptions
underlying the Ricardian structure. In that case the equilibrium depends
on the precise time path of taxes.17
Inthe next section we analyze the characteristics and the determinants
of the endogenous variables under the two formulations of the dual
exchange—rate regimes. Thus we examine the evolution of (i) the dual
exchange—rate premium under the assumption that there is a quota on net
external borrowing and (ii) the magnitude of net externalborrowing under the
assumption that •both the comercial and the financial exchange rates are
pegged.
11.4. The Quota on External Borrowing and the Flexible DualExchange Rate
Premi urn
When there is a quota on the path of net external borrowing the
authorities are assumed to peg the comercialexchange rate, e, while letting
the financial exchange rate,s, be determined in the free market. In
equilibrium the market—determined financial exchange ratemay differ from the
pegged comercial rate. We define the exchange rate premium by the percentage
discrepancy between s and e; that is, the premium Is (s/e)—1. In this
section we analyze the determinants of this premium. In addition to
attempting to clarify the working of dual exchange rate regimes, our interest
in analyzing the determinants of the premium sterns from the fact that the
assumption that the authorities are capable of separating the markets and
preventing arbitrage between the corrmercjal and the financial exchange rates
may be rendered invalid if the premium gets too large. Thus, our analysis may
be useful for identifying the factors that are relevant for determining
whether the dual exchange—rate regime is viable.
In order to gain insights into the factors governing the magnitude of the.
exchange—rate premium and the viability of the dual exchange—rate regime we
simplify the exposition and divide the horizon into two: the present (t=O)
and the future (t1,...,.). We assume that the quota and, thereby, the dual18
exchange—rate regime, are in effect for rperiodsafter which the quota is
relaxed and the financial exchange rate is unified with the pegged connercial
rate. Throughout the future the world rate of interest, and the levels of
output and taxes are assumed to be constant. We further assume that the
corririercial exchange rate is pegged at the level e =1and we define units so
as to set the (constant) world price level at unity. In Appendix II we derive
the explicit solutions for the equilibrium value of the financial exchange
rate. Since the coimiercial exchange rate is pegged these expressions are also
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As is evident, the equilibrium value of the financial exchange rate in
period zero which is the domestic price of the foreign-currency linked debt at
the beginning of this period depends on the money supply, output, taxes, and the
rate of interest as well as on the magnitude of the historically given foreign
debt and the size of the quota. In addition, the value of the financial rate
also depends on the length of the period tduringwhich the quota is in effect.
From equation (14) it is seen that during the period for which the dual
exchange—rate regime is in effect the initial equilibrium value of the financial
exchange rate, s, depends positively on the existing money supply 1-T (a stock
which was carried over from the previous period net of period zero taxes).19
Likewise, the value of sdepends negatively on the size of the quota on ex-
ternal debt, B* (when taxes exceed the initial debt commitment) and on future
taxes, T. In general, except for the money stock which exerts a direct effect
on the financial exchange rate, the other factors influence the equilibrium
value of sthrough their influence on the real rate of interest. Those
factors which lower the real rate of interest induce an increase in the ex-
change rate premium and vice versa.
Equation (13) specifies the equilibrium value of the financial exchange
rate for all future periods during whichthedual exchange—rate regime
operates. In addition to providing information on the impact of the various
variables on the level of the exchange rate, equation (13) can also be used in
order to determine the evolution of the premium over time as well as to assess
the likely viability of the dual rate regime.
In this context it is relevant to note that the evolution of the financial
rate (as measured by the ratio s/s0) does not depend on the length of
the period t.Theevolution of the financial exchange rate is explained as
follows. The stationary levels of outputs, interest rates and prices imply
that as long as the level of the quota is fixed, consumption must be fixed.
Obviously, from the consumption function (4) such stationarity is achieved if
the real rate of interest equals the rate of time preference. Thus,
stJst_i must equal 1/aR, and Xt isproportional to (l/fSR)t
The assumption that the quota is binding implies that the economy is a
dissaver. This implies that the rate of interest is smaller than the
subjective rate of time preference and, therefore, that the product Ra is
smaller than unity. From equation (13) it is seen that when Ra <1the
financial exchange rate and, thereby, the exchange—rate premium rises over
time. Obviously, under such circumstances for a large enough value of tthe20
assumption that the authorities can separate the markets and prevent
profitable artibrage between the commercial and the financial exchange rates
becomes highly questionable. It follows, therefore, that the length of the
period t,cannotexceed a critical value since otherwise at some future date
the size of the quota will have to be modified. Thus the present benchmark
model illustrates the difficulties associated with the design of a dual
exchange—rate regime which is based on a permanent quota.
In addition to the long run difficulties induced by potential arbitrage,
the dual exchange rate regime which is Implemented by fixing a permanent quota
is severely limited by more basic considerations of the overall consistency of
the model. Specifically, as shown in Appendix II, when x =1/ERequations
(10) and (12) imply that the value of 8* must equal
B*_D Q*
1 —'-i'-i1•
Anypermanent quota which differs from 8* is inconsistent with equilibrium
and thus cannot be sustained. Thus, when 8*, the authorities can only
introduce a temporary fixed quota.
11.5. Unconstrained External Borrowing and the Pegged Dual Exchange Rate
Premium
In the preceding section we assumed that the government pegs the
corrrnercial exchange rate and sets a binding quota on the volume of external
borrowing. The financial exchange rate and thereby the dual exchange—rate
premium was allowed to be determined in the free market. In this section we
consider the alternative specification of the exchange—rate policy according
to which the government is assumed to peg both the comercial and the
financial exchange rates (and, thereby, it pegs the dual exchange—rate
premium). With this specification the volume of external borrowing is allowed21
to be determined freely according to the private sectorspreferences. As in
the previous specification the present formulation of the dualexchange—rate
regime also exhibits the limitations on the conduct of policies andon the
viability of the dual exchange—rate regime.
In specifying this version of the regimewe adopt the same assumptions as
in Section 11.4 concerning world pricesand rate of interest, domestic output
and taxes, and the comercial exchange rate.In addition we also assume that
the authorities set the initial financialexchange rate at s and allow
for a constant percentage change thereof.Accordingly, for the period
O,..., during which the dual exchange—rateregime is in effect, the
evolution of the financial exchange rate isgoverned by s/s0 =x.
Using equations (11)—(12) the implied equilibrium valueof initial wealth and
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Equation (15)specifiesthe initial equilibrium value of private
wealth. As usual the value of W0 depends positively on current and future
outputs and negatively on current and future rates of interest (which impact
on the discounting of future incomes). The expression in equation (15) also
illustrates the dependence of on x —theconstant percentage change
in the premium —andon the length of the period during which the dual
exchange—rate regime is in effect. As is evident, a higher premium lowers
wealth. The interpretation of this result is that the premium raises the
domestic real rates of interest and thereby it lowers the present value of
current and future income streams. The effect of changes in on the
equilibrium value of initial wealth depends on whether the financial exchange
rate rises or falls over time, that is, if x exceeds or falls short of
unity. If the financial exchange rate rises over time so that x >1,then
lengthening the period during which the dual exchange—rate regime operates
(i.e. raising r) results in a lower value of and vice versa. The
interpretation of these results is also given in terms of the effects of t
onthe discounting' of future income streams. Accordingly, if x exceeds
unity, the domestic interest rates exceed world rates; therefore, under these
circumstances extending tlengthensthe period during which high discount
factors apply.
Equations (16) characterize the determinants of the equilibrium values of
external borrowing. As seen in (16—i) the current value of B: depends
on current equilibrium wealth, on current output and on past debt comitment.
A rise in V0 lowers external borrowing due to the usual mecharrism of
consumption—smoothing, whereas a rise in 14 raises consumption and,
thereby, raises external borrowing. In view of our discussion of equation
(15) it is clear that a higher value of current and future rates of interest23
and exchange—rate premium lowers external borrowing whereas the effect of a
rise in the length of the period rdepends on whether the financial exchange
rate rises or falls over time.
Equations (16—u) and (16—i ii) show the evolution of equilibrium external
borrowings for the period during which the dual exchange—rate rate operates
(up to period r) as well as for the subsequent period (beyond period r). As
seen, the value of external borrowing at period ,t,B;, consists of the
difference between the present values of cumulative past as well as current
consumptions and the corresponding present values of outputs. This difference
is adjusted for the current value of the initial debt connitment. The
interest rates used in the computations of the present values are the world
rates of interest. As is evident, the effect of the magnitude of the pegged
premiums on operates through its impact on the cumulative present
values of past and current consumptions (the second term on the
right—hand—sides of equations (16—li) and (16—ui)). These effects are
ambiguous since on the one hand a rise in x lowers and thereby lowers
consumption in all periods up to period t. The reduced level of consumption
results in a lower value of external borrowing. On the other hand the rise
in x raises the domestic rate of interest and, therefore, givenW0, it
induces a rise in savings from period zero up to period t. This rise in past
values
effect
savings yields higher of current wealth and consumption and induces a
rise in Bt. The net seems to depend on the relative magnitudes
of these factors. It may be shown, however, that around an initial value of
x =1,the effect of a rise in x on the value of the external debt in the
period during which the dual exchange rate regime operates is positive.
Finally, the effect of extending the period of the dual exchange—rate regime
on the value of the external debt operates through its impact on W0. As24
was shown earlier, this depends on whether the dual exchange—rate premium is
positive or negative. Specifically, a rise in traises and thereby
raises if x <1and vice versa.
In the preceding discussion we examined the effects of various changes on
the value of wealth and on the evolution of external debt (and implicitly on
the levels of consumption and the current account of the balance of
payments). These comparative static questions should be interpreted as
reflecting the effects of temporary measures. In the long run if the dual
exchange—rate regime were to last indefinitely, there would be severe
constraints that limit the choice of the pegged dual exchange—rate premium.
It is argued in Appendix III that a dual exchange rate regime with permanently
pegged premiums cannot be sustained indefinitely unless the authorities peg
the premium in a way that equates domestic and foreign real rates of interest
or, alternatively, unless the authorities peg the premium in such a way so as
to yield domestic rates of interest that induce zero savings. Thus, the two
sustainable permanent paths of the premium are either a path along which x =
1or a path along which x =1/6R.In the first case the evolution of the
financial exchange rate yields identical real allocations as those obtained
under free foreign—exchange markets. In the second case the choice of the
premium eliminates the capital account of the balance of payments.
The analysis of the constraints on the long—run viability of the pegged
dual exchange—rate regime also illustrates the similarities between the
version discussed in section 11.4 in which the authorities set a fixed quota,
and the version discussed in the present section in which the authorities set
the premium by fixing the percentage change in the financial exchange rate.
Specifically, the case in which x =1is analogous to the case in which the
quota is nonbinding and the case in which x =1/SRis equivalent to the case25
in which the quota is set at a level whichgenerates zero savings.11 Both
versions face difficulties in sustaining long—runviability of the dual
exchange—rate regime. In both cases the long run problemsare induced by the
ultimate futility of separating the commercial and the financialexchange
markets from the forces of profit—seeking arbitrage. Inaddition, there are
alsothelong—run difficulties which stem from violations of solvencycon-
straints. Thus, the present benchmark model highlights thebasic difficulties
associated with the adoption of a permanent dual exchange—rateregime.
III. Commercial Exchange—Rate Policies in a Model withOverlapping
Generations with a Finite Horizon
The benchmark model of section II was characterizedby the Ricardian—
equivalence property according to which for a given dualexchange—rate policy
the behavior of the infinitely lived population isinvariant with respect to
the timing of taxes and monetary transfers. As a result ofthis Richardian
property the level of the commercial exchange rate,
e0 ,playedno critical
role. In the present section we extend theanalytical framework to a non—
Ricardian world.
111.1. The Overlapping Generations Model
We use a version of an overlapping—generations model in whicheach
generation has a finite horizon. More specifically, in order to obtainsimple
aggregate behavior we adopt Blanchard's (1985) formulation by whichoutput per
capita is fixed and each individual's probability of survival between two
consecutive periods is 1(0< y < 1) which is assumed to be independent of
age. The size of each cohort at birth is normalized to unity and,therefore,26
its size at age a is The size of the population is the sum of all the
sizes of all cohorts. Thus the (fixed) population size isEla =1/1—1
The risk—free rate of interest is given by the world at the level r
where r =R—1 .Therate of interest that governs the behavior of
individuals takes into account the risk associated with mortality.
Competition in capital markets implies that the individual risk premium is set




Inorder to incorporate these considerations into thestructure of the
benchmark model we start with the specification of theindividual and then
aggregate the quantities that are applicable toeach individual into those of
the aggregate private sector. Analogously to equation(1) the typical budget




where Ca,t and bat denote, respectively, the levelof consumption and
the size of debt of an individual of age a at time t, y,denotes
per—capita output. Consolidation of the periodic budgetconstraints yields
equation (18) as the size of wealth, Wao of an individualof age a at
period t =0.
*
(18)Wao =- + it-i
- ba_i,_i]•
The budget constraints require that the discounted sum ofconsumption
equals the value of wealth so that
S t
o
*1t—01'a t =' e
— '
OrO27
As is evident from the definition of
wealth, the discounting is performed with
the aid of the risk—adjusted discountfactor y/R.Thisshould be constructed
with the formulation in equation(2) of the benchmark model th which the
discount factor used by the privatesector was the world risk—free discount
factor hR.
The equilibrium value of wealth W is computed in an analogous
a,o
manner to that in section II by taking into account the government foreign
exchange interventions (equation (5)), the money market clearing condition
(9), and noting that the monetary injections induced by foreignexchange
interventions which accrue to the cohort ofage a are
**
(5N) —e(B — RBt1)
+st(Bt
—RBt1).
Following a similar procedure outlined in Appendix I the equilibrium wealth of
an individual of age a at period t =0is
*
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Recalling that the size of the population is ]./(1—), the aggregate
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Equation (20) specifies the equilibrium value of per—capita wealth at period
t =0.It is the analogue to equation (10) of the benchmark model. As may be
seen, the two expressions coincide in the special case of '= 1.In general
the role of the finite horizon is manifested through three channels. First,
as indicated earlier, the discounting of future flows is performed by using
the risk adjusted discount factor y/R. Second, the value of r together
with the dual exchange rate policy determine the impact of the difference
between the domestic private real rate of interest and the corresponding world
safe rate on the equilibrium value of initial wealth. As in the benchmark
model [e/s —e+i/s+iJ
measures the distortion. In the present
case, however, the discounting is done by using the risk—adjusted discount
factor. Third, the value of determines the effect of changes in
government debt (associated with interventions in the financill exchange rate)
on private wealth. This channel is represented by the last term on the
right—hand—side of equation (20). In the extreme case of infinite horizon
(with .= 1)the last term vanishes and the Ricardian proposition reemerges.
With a finite horizon, (with-r <1)changes in government debt that are
induced by interventions in the financial exchange rate induce changes in
private—sector's net wealth. These changes in wealth arise from the fact that
the private sector discounts the future flows of taxes by using the
risk—adjusted discount factor T/R whereas the government uses the risk—free
world discount factor, hR. In the special case for which there is no
intervention in the financial exchange rate, e s. (since .!B = Be).
Inthat case equation (20) coincides with (10'). Finally we note that all
the terms on the right—hand—side of (20) except for the last term depend on
the relation between the relative evolutions of the commercial and the financial
exchange rates, e /eand s /sbut not on the initial difference between the to to
levels of the two exchange rates. On the other hand the last term on the right—
hand—side of (20) depends on the initial value of s/e .Fora positive debt29
a rise in s /eraises indebtedness and lowers wealth. This dependenceon the 00
levelof the exchange rate reflects the departure from theRicardian equivalence
and indeed when y =1,thelast term vanishes, the equilibrium value of initial
wealth does not depend on the levels of theinitial exchange rates and the
Ricardian proposition reemerges.
Finally, Since in our dual exchange rate regime, without fiscal
policies, (e/s)B equation (20) can be simplified to
*
(21) [1US(Y)tttt + 1 — 5)B—
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111.2. Devaluation and the Timing ofMonetary Injections
In this section we examine the effects of
commercial exchange—rate policies
on the exchange—rate premium. Obviously theseeffects depend crucially on the
timing of the monetary injections that areassociated with the management of
the two exchange rates. In orderto sharpen the analysis we assume that the
monetary policy is not perfectly coordinated to offsetchanges in the pegged
commercial exchange rate. With perfectcoordination devaluations affect only
nominal magnitudes withoutany impact on the real equilibrium of the system.13
Consider a stylized, example, with stationaryoutputs, in which the
commercial exchange rate is raised at time tOfromits previous unitary
level to e and the new rate is then maintainedthroughout the entire
future. The change in the current level of wealthis given by
(22) Wo 2::::! — — L...
e e(R—y) e
Thefirst term on the right hand side ofequation (22) represents the
capital gains that are associated with the revaluation of themoney
stock— the propotlonal decline in prices,(l—e)/e, times the realvalue
ofmoney, y. The second and the third terms ontheright hand side of
equation(22) represent the implied change inmonetary absorption (taxes)30
in the present, T ,andin the entire future T ,where(y/(R—y) is the
discounted sumofone—dollar stream commencing in period t1, evaluated with
the effective discount factor (y/R). The tax change is required in order to
preserve solvency of the government budget in the face of the declinein foreign
exchange reserves by the amount [(l—e)/e]y —LT/e .Thisdecline equals the
fall in demand for domestic money minus money withdrawls through taxes. The






where 1/CR—i) is the discounted sum of a one—dollar stream commencing in
period t=1, evaluated with the market discount factor l/R. Equation (23) in-
dicates that in the absence of initial government debt and government spending,
the sum of the present values of explicit taxes (T and T) and inflationary
taxes [(e—l)/ey must be zero. From equation (23) we can solve for the change
in future taxes =CR—i)(1_e)
— .Substitutingthis expression
into equation (22) yields:
(24) W (1-T)(4) [(i)-
Itis worth noting that when i'l,equation(24) implies that w =0; that is,
devaluations have no real effects.
For simplicity assume now that the transitory quota on external
borrowing is in effect only in the first two periods, t=0, 1. Using
equations (21) and (24) yields:
(25) =+x(R-y) Y + (l) (R-) -
+,[Li] —RB* ,wherexs /s x —1—1 1 031
Under the assumption thatthe utilityfunction is logarithmic and that
the subjective discount factor, 6, is constant it can be shown that the
aggregate consumption function (which is derived from individuals'
maximization of expected utility) is c (l—6)W. Using this function
and the familiar relationship of national accounts we deri'e B =B
(26) *(l—yô)W÷ R_1B1 —y
-* Fora given level of quota on external borrowing, B ,equations(25)—
(26) yield a solution for the percentage future change in the financial
exchange rate (from period 0 to period 1). The rise in the coerciai
exchange rate in period 0 impacts negatively on the level of wealth and
on the evolution of the financial exchange rate over time. This is seen









It is noteworthy, again, that in the special case in which y=1 the devalua-
tion has no effect on the evolution of the exchange rate premium over time.
Since the effective real discount rate equals RxI-ythedevaluation lowers
the effective real interest rate. Substituting equations (24)—(25) in the





Equation(29) expresses current wealth in termsofthe real value of the
stock of money in the beginning of period o plus the present value of the
output stream (note that the nominal proceeds from sales of output are
distributed with one period lag, requiring discounting to the present by32
the factor y/xR), minusthepresent value of taxes, plus the capital
gains arising from the devaluation, and minus the initial debt obligation.
Given the quota on external borrowing, B* ,thenew commercial
exchange rate, e, and period zero tax changes, T, (which yield the
solution for x and from equations (25)—(26)), equation (28) can be
solved for s and the implied exchange rate premium. To evaluate the
effect of the devaluation (with no change in current monetary injections)
on the exchange rate premium, we differentiate equation (29), and using
(27)—(28), yields:
ds (H—T )/e
(30 I__(_._2.•t 1 — ° + (1—r)rr....L' —... + Ry(y—T)
's1de ' sRB*sR B* R—e —
o a —1 —1 o —1 —1 (R_T)(y(Ry)B*)
As can be seen from equation (30) with a positive initial external
debt the rise in the commercial exchange rate does not, in general, lead
to a proportional increase in the free financial exchange rate. The fall
in the real value of the initial stock of money taken by itself leads to
a decline in the financial exchange rate whereas the effect of the devalua-
tion on the effective real interest rate, taken by itself, raises the
financial exchange rate. When the initial stock of money (relative to
output) is small the financial exchange rate overshoots and the exchange
rate premium rises and vice versa.
In this section we have analysed the circumstances under which changes
in the levels of the commercial exchange rate and of the nominal money stock
influence the real equilibrium. We focused on the effects of these policies
on the real value of initial private sector debt commitment, the real value
of wealth, the effective real interest rate and the intergenerational dis-
tribution of welfare. The real effects of such policies (that is, the
departure from the Ricardian equivalence) stem from the "myopic" element in33
private sector behavior reflecting the finiteness of life.15These issues of
the neutrality of money supply and of exchange ratepolicies carry over to a
more elaborate framework in which theeconomy produces tradable and non—
tradable goods. In that case the nominalexchange rate regime is not neutral
in its effect on the real exchange rate andchanges in the money stock and in
the nominal exchange rate impact on the realexchange rate.16
IV. Concluding Remarks
This paper introduced critical intertemporalconsiderations into the
analysis of dual exchange—rate systems. These Intertemporal considerations
cast serious doubts on the long—run viability of suchexchange—rate regimes.
Specifically, we have examined in detail the restrictions thatsolvency
requirements on both the private and the public sectorsimpose on the
admissible set of policies.
Even though dual exchange rate regimesmay not be viable in the long
run, they can be substained in the short run. In this context we have
specified the nature of the distortions introduced by theadoption of dif-
ferent exchange rates for commercial and for financialtransactions and we
have examined the implications of theregime for the intertemporal distribu-
tion of effective taxes and for the intergenerationaldistribution of welfare.
Our model has been characterized by forwardlooking individuals who take
full account of current and prospectivegovernment policies. We have used the
model in order to specify the precise mechanismsand monetary changes as-
sociated with the dual exchange—rate policies. Inso doing we have provided
an analytical framework that facilitates the identificationand clarification
of the mechanisms governing the operation of dualexchange rate systems.314
Whilewe have focused on the limited viability of dual exchange rate
regimes, our analysis is also applicable for the ongoing discussion of the
sequencing of economic liberalization policies. One of the key questions
addressed in that discussion concerned the consequences of a removal of
restrictions on current—account and on capital—account transactions. In
particular, a debated issue has been the proper order in which such restric-
tions ought to be removed.17 Our analysis of the operation of the system
under a bInding quota on external borrowing has implications for that debate.35
APPENDIX
I. The equilibrium Value of
In order to compute the equilibrium valueof initial wealth, W0, we
first rewrite equation (2) of the textas
* *
etp g_10 ______ =*+ z;0 dte1p1 (1.1) 5dtCt
e0p0 Stt_1
Tts0RB_1 W0. -1 It_idt
e0p0
_____ 1 where dt =* Lii...RtI
e0p0 o
Next, we note that from equation (6) in the text
(1.2) Mti_TtIMt_Xt
Using the money market equilibrium condition (9)we replace
*
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SubstitutingetPtY for Mt yields
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Equation (1.4) shows that the equilibrium value of W0 depends on
which, in turn, reflects the precise specification of the dual
exchange—rate regime. In order to obtain further insights wesubstitute
equation (5) of the text for X. Accordingly the term
_Z0dt !canbe written as:
d detp(Yt_Ct) s(B — 1t=ott=ot
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Substituting (1.5) into (1.4) yields equation (10) of the text.
II. The Equilibrium Dual Exchange—Rate Premium
In this part of the appendix we derive the expressions relevant for the
analysis of the equilibrium dual exchange rate premium for the case in whichthe
authorities peg the commercial exchange rate and set a quota for ronthe volume
of external debt .Weassume that from period +1 onwards the quota
is relaxed and the financial exchange rate is unified with the pegged
commercial exchange rate. In order to gain insight we specialize theanalysis
to the case in which the policyis stationary in the sense that37
= ande =e=1.We further focus on the equilibrium in which the
world price and rate of interest are stationary, that isp =p 1
In order to be able to analyze the effect of aonce and for all change in
the paths of Output and world interest rates, we distinguish between the
current interest rate and outut, represented by
R0 and Y0,andtheir
corresponding future stationary values R and V.

















From(II—1)(a) the initial equilibrium value ofW0 is
+Y -R B*
(11—2) = —1 —1 -1
From (II—1)—(b) together with (11—2)we can solve for the value, of
during the r periods for which the quota is in effect. Thus,
(11—3) 5tV —(R—1) 1
S0TIR0W0 Rt_14t
for t
Equation (11—3) specifies the evolution of thefinancial exchange rate.
Finally, in order to determine the initial equilibrium value ofthe financial38
exchange rate we substitute equations (11—2) and (11—3) into equation (2)of
the text noting that for the periods s =e
=1,and















III.TheConstraints on the Choice of the Pegged Exchange—Rate Premium
In this part of the appendix we compute the values of the pegged
exchange—rate premium that are consistent with the maintenance of an
indefinite dual exchange rate regime. The solvency constraint requires that
at the limit, the discounted value of external debt must be zero, mamely,





Inthe case for which x =1the value of is given by equation
(10') of the text. Substituting (10) into the above solvency constraint and
assuming that outputs prices and the rates of interest are stationary,reveals
that the constraint is satisfied. In that case the domestic real rates of
Interest equal the world levels.39
Another feasible path for the exchange ratepremium can be obtained by
inducing an equality between income and spending. Under such circumstances
the current account of the balance—of-.payments isbalanced and the value of
the external debt remains stationary. Witha fixed it is evident
that the solvency constraint is satisfied.Finally, in order to induce such
an equality between spending and income (withstationary outputs, prices and
rates of interest) equation (4) in the textimplies that x must equal 1/dR.
In order to compare the fixed quota *which results ina value of x
that is equal to (1/dR) we substitute(1/6R) for x into equation (10)
in the text and obtain




- y * (1_sR)B* - — R_1B+()
On the other hand equation (12) Impliesthat for x •1/aR
DD*
Y ,R—1 1_1u_1 = —
(1—s)
These two equations forW0 imply that
8* =
1
Note that In the present case with aR<1,8* >0.
Finally It can be shown that any constant value of the dualexchange—rate
premium other than x1 or x —1/aR,results in an inconsistency among
equations (10), (1611) and the solvency requirement.FOO TN OTES
1For a recent analysis see Dornsusch (1985) and for a survey see Lanyi
(1975).
2For an analysis of aspects of the relations between taxes on capital
flows, quantitative controls and dual exchange rates see Adams and Greenwood
(1985), Greenwood and Kimbrough (19814), Liviatan (1981), and Stockman and
Hernandes (1985). For a related analysis of the insulation properties of two—
tier exchange—rate systems see Argy and Porter (1972), Fleming (1971), Flood and
Marion (1982), Marion (1981) and Swoboda (19714).
3For an analysis of dual exchange rates or capital controls in the context
of public finance and distortionary taxes see Aizenman (1986) and Persson and
Svensson (1985) and for an analysis of dual exchange rates as a second—best
policy see Adams and Greenwood (1985), Basevi (1985) and Flood andMarion
(1982).
14Among the numerous studies dealing with these issues are Aizenman
(1985), Cumby (19814), de Macedo (1982), Dornbusch (1976, 1985), Flood (1978),
Guidotti (1985), Lizondo (19814), Mussa (1986), Obstfeld (19814) and van
Wijnbergen (1985).
5me fact that In general a dual exchange—rate regime is not viable in the
long run implies that a steady—state analysis of such a regime may not be
meaningful. Therefore, great care should be given to steady—state results that
are based on descriptive models which are not constrained by intertemporal
solvency requirements.6For ananalysis of the effects of departures from a complete segmentation
between the commercial and financial exchange markets see Bhandariand Decaluwe
(19814).
7A similarmethodology is employed in the analysis of the effects of a
devaluation from an initial position of balance of payments equilibrium, andin
the analysis of the effects of a tariff or a quota Ina small competitive (price
taking) open economy. In both cases the model itself does not provide a
rationale for the policy but the analysis yields insights into thepure effects
of such policies.
e S 8 00 1 The solvency condition is urn— R R• R Bt
= t+t t o1'•'t
9The presentspecification presumes that the exchange rate applicable to
debt—service payments is the financial exchange rate, 5. Alternatively, we
could have assumed (following some conventions) that theexchange rate appli-
cable to debt—service payments is the commercial exchange rate. In thatcase, a







In that case the intertemporal price of (the relative price of consumption
in two consecutive periods) is [(set1)/e(R1-.1) +st]1'[st_ietlstet_i].In
that case the domestic rate of interest equals the foreign rate if
et=s=s_1.
The key results of our analysis do not depend on this specification.
°The solvencyrequirement specifies that at the limit the discounted




referencewe note that R1B1/p0 in equation (8) can also be viewed as
summarizing the path of current and future government spending. Specifically, a
rise in government spending entails, in present value terms, a higher value of
initial debt. Therefore, this formulation is also useful for theanalysis of
the effects of fiscal policies.11The real allocations induced by a policy which pegs the value of x at
a level 1/SR will be identical to those obtained by fixing a permanent quota
—* —* * 1
Bat a level B =R_13_1
as shown in Appendix III.
12For a detailed description of such a model see Blanchard (1985) and
Frenkel and Razin (19814, 1986). For a Monetary model which uses a similar
framework see Helpman andRazin(1985).
13The subsequent discussion draws on I-ielpman and Razin (1985). We assume
that the devaluation of the currency does not result in real revaluation of
private debt, or alternatively, that if there are capital gains on existing debt
they are taxed away immediately.
114Note that private sector's solvency condition implies that the external
*
debt,RB ,mustbe smaller than the present value of labor income Ry/(R—Y).
5It is relevant to note, however, that in principle these real effects
can be avoided by adopting a specific course of monetary policy designed to
offset capital gains and losses on existing assets.
l6For a thorough analysis of the lack of neutrality of the nominal
exchange rate regime in Its relation to the real exchange rate see Mussa (1985).
17For an analysis of these issues see Frenkel (1982, 1983), Edwards
(1985), Khan and Zhaller (1983) andMcKinnon(1982).L3
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